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“Une Permission!
C’est bon pour une recrue”
Discipline and Illegal Absences in the
22nd (French-Canadian) Battalion, 1915-1919
Maxime Dagenais

D

espite the 22nd (FrenchCanadian) Battalion’s extraordinary courage on the battlefields
of Europe throughout the First
World War, its reputation remains
tarnished by the belief that it suffered
from a disciplinary problem. In
fact, the unit’s behaviour has led
to a considerable debate. Whereas
several historians have argued
that the battalion’s thousands of
infractions and five executions show
a disciplinary problem, others have
stated that a lack of comparison
with other units of the Canadian
Expeditionary Force (CEF) render
these figures, and this assumption,
unfounded.
The first historian to suggest a
discipline problem was Desmond
Morton in a 1972 article entitled
“The Supreme Penalty.” He noted
that the men of the battalion were
“conspicuously over-represented”
amongst the executed soldiers of the
Canadian Expeditionary Force.1 In Le
22e bataillon (canadien-français), 19141919, Jean-Pierre Gagnon argued
that the written evidence provided
by the commander of the battalion,
Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas
Tremblay, and statistics on the unit’s
minor and court-martial infractions
confirm its poor reputation.2 More
than a quarter of a century after

Abstract: This article explores two
issues relating to the Canadian
experience during the First World
War, but more specifically, to that
of the 22nd (French-Canadian)
Battalion (commonly referred to as
the “Van Doos”). It first considers the
assumption that the 22nd Battalion
suffered from a disciplinary problem.
By examining the disciplinary records
of the other three battalions of the
5th Brigade (the brigade of which
the “Van Doos were a part) and
comparing them to that of the 22nd
Battalion, this article conclusively
demonstrates that the unit did suffer
from a disciplinary problem. This
article also examines the causes
of the unit’s disciplinary problems.
Evidence suggests that poor morale
was the likely cause.

Morton’s article, historians continue
to discuss the poor discipline of
the battalion. In a master’s thesis
entitled “Arbitrary Justice?: A
Comparative Analysis of Canadian
Death Sentences Passed and Death
Sentences Commuted during the
First World War,” Teresa Iacobelli
suggests that the battalion’s overall
poor behaviour was an important
factor in its numerous executions.
She also referred to the unit as the
“infamously poorly disciplined
22nd Battalion.”3 In For Freedom and
Honour?: The Story of the 25 Canadian
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Volunteers Executed in the First World
War, however, Andrew B. Godefroy
concluded that “due to a lack of any
detailed research on the issue, one
cannot properly argue as to whether
the number of disciplinary infractions
in the 22nd Battalion was high or low
when compared to other units in the
CEF.” 4 Godefroy did not provide
this comparison. Similarly, Patrick
Bouvier, in a study entitled Déserteurs
et insoumis. Les Canadiens français
et la justice militaire, questioned the
validity of the battalion’s notoriety.
Like Godefroy he argued that, without
a comparative base, it is impossible
to conclude that the number of
infractions committed by FrenchCanadians was truly representative
of their discipline.5 Bouvier did not
provide this comparative material.
This article will reassess the 22nd
Battalion’s behaviour in a comparative
context.6 Through a qualitative and
quantitative analysis of the discipline
of the 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade
(22nd, 24th, 25th, and 26th Battalions)
of the 2nd Canadian Division, it will
demonstrate that the 22nd Battalion
did, in fact, suffer from a disciplinary
problem. For results to be as fair as
possible, the comparison units must
share an operational history similar
to that of the “Van Doos,” as the 22nd
Battalion was familiarly known. Of
3
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Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas
Tremblay (left), commanding
officer of the 22nd Battalion,
and his second-in-command,
Major Arthur Dubuc (right),
were both aware of the
disciplinary problems among
their men and took “drastic
measures” to repair the
discipline of the battalion.

the hundreds of units that comprised
the CEF, only the battalions of the
5th Canadian Infantry Brigade meet
that criterion. They not only took
part in the same minor and major
operations, but spent the entirety
of their war alongside the 22nd
Battalion. The evidence from the
comparative information suggests
that the 22nd Battalion suffered from
poor discipline. Further evidence
suggests that this poor discipline
resulted from poor morale caused
by the arrival of new recruits and a
change in leadership.

Discipline in the 5th
Canadian Infantry Brigade
The Ill-disciplined “Van Doos”

O

n 15 October 1914, the 22nd
Battalion was born after the
Canadian government officially
approved the creation of a FrenchCanadian unit. The battalion was
unique in the CEF as the only
combatant unit whose official
language was French. The majority
of its soldiers were French-speaking
and officers gave their orders and
instructions in French. After months
of training in Saint-Jean, Quebec and
Amherst, Nova Scotia, the battalion

4
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departed for Europe aboard HMT
Saxonia on 20 May 1915. The unit
arrived in England nine days later,
and began training at East Sandling
camp. On 15 September 1915, these
inexperienced soldiers were finally
put to the test as they left their
training fields and headed to France.
The most convincing evidence
that justifies the 22nd Battalion’s
reputation are the various accounts
and comments of officers and
soldiers from various battalions,
brigades and divisions during
and after the war. During the war
the commanding officers of the
battalion often complained about
the unit’s disciplinary problems.
These complaints also show that the
battalion’s problems began after the
Somme operations of 1916 and lasted
well into the summer of 1917.
The Somme operations proved
especially costly. Although the
battalion successfully captured the
village of Courcelette, it suffered
many casualties and the composition
of the unit was significantly altered as
a result. By the end of December 1916,
the battalion had received more than
500 reinforcements who constituted
more than half of the membership
of the battalion. The commanding
officers of the battalion, LieutenantColonel Thomas Tremblay and

Major Arthur Dubuc, who replaced
Tremblay while the latter had took ill,
first noted the poor discipline of their
unit in November 1916. Tremblay was
still in hospital when Dubuc paid him
a visit in London. Tremblay noted
their conversation in his diary: “Le
nouveau bataillon a dans ces cadres un
trop grand nombre d’hommes plutôt
dégénérés...Enfin, Dubuc m’assure
que la situation s’améliore, que
graduellement le bataillon reviendra
ce qu’il était.”7 Unfortunately, the
situation did not improve and the
battalion’s discipline deteriorated
to the point where the commanding
officer of the 2nd Canadian Division,
Major-General R.E.W. Turner, got
involved. In January 1917, Tremblay
noted in his diary, “Il y a beaucoup
d’absence sans permission au 22e et
le Général Turner est anxieux que je
retourne en France au plus vite.”8 The
battalion’s poor discipline resulted
in much criticism from several other
brigade and divisional commanders.9
For example, Brigadier-General
H.D.B. Ketchen, commander of the
6th Brigade, noted that “The crime
of desertion from the trenches is
very prevalent in this Battalion [the
22nd], and it is considered that unless
examples are immediately made
in such cases, that this crime will
continue.”10
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For the next eight months, the
battalion seemed to be in crisis
as Tremblay, Dubuc, and other
commanders frequently complained
about insubordinate behaviour. As a
result, Tremblay had to use drastic
measures to repair the discipline of
his unit. During a meeting with the
unit’s officers, on 3 March 1917, he
reminded them that it was their duty
to “raidir la discipline,” if there was
any chance of fixing “l’état pitoyable
du bataillon.”11 Tremblay used harsh
penalties, such as courts-martial and
executions for desertion, to restore
the character that the unit had prior
to Courcelette. Tremblay’s measures
were successful. By the summer of
1917, the situation in the “Van Doos”
stabilized and improved. For example,
at Private Alexandre Dumesnil’s
court-martial in September 1917,
Dubuc noted, “The state of discipline
of the Battalion is at present very
good. Absences without leave are
very rare.”12
After the war, various veterans
who served with and alongside the
“Van Doos” also commented on the
battalion’s discipline. In fact, many
attempted to justify or even apologize
for it. In 1934, Claudius Corneloup,
of the 22nd Battalion, published
a novel entitled La Coccinelle du
22e, which was loosely based on
the front-line experiences of the
“Van Doos.” Within its pages, he
reproduced a conversation between
a veteran and a young recruit.
The exchange illustrates the unit’s
indifference towards the rules and
regulations of the military. When
the recruit expressed concern about
being arrested by the military police
for an illegal absence, the veteran
responded: “C’est parce que c’est ta
première escapade mon garçon!...
Quand tu y seras habitué, tu diras
comme l’ami Germinal: ‘Je m’en
fiche!’”13 Another soldier also cried
out: “Une permission!...c’est bon pour
une recrue.”14
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provide an overview of discipline as
they include every minor infraction
that was punished. During the unit’s
three years at the front, a total of 2,475
minor infractions were punished. See
Table 1 for their breakdown.
The most noticeable statistic is
how frequent illegal absences were in
comparison to all other infractions.20
In fact, of the 2,475 infractions, 1,660
were for the crime of illegal absence,
67 percent of the total. During its
first year at the front, the unit was
thus punished for an average of
86.4 infractions per month, 62.6
infractions during its second year,
and 52.9 during its final year. The
unit’s average throughout the war
was 66.9 infractions per month.21 A
more detailed examination of minor

In 1962-63, the Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation (CBC)
conducted a series of interviews
with First World War veterans. The
men talked about the motivations
for their enlistments, the campaigns
in which they took part, their lives
after the war, and the memories
and friendships with which they
returned from the front. However,
when interviewing soldiers of the
“Van Doos,” or when referring to the
unit itself with soldiers of other units,
the interviewers kept asking about
its rowdiness and indiscipline at the
front. For example, Major Mitchell,
of the 24th Battalion, noted that the
Van Doos “weren’t as susceptible to
discipline as we [the 24th Battalion]
were.”15 He even recalled a humorous

Table 1 – Minor infractions of the 22nd Battalion19
Absences

Drunkenness

Other Infractions

Total

October 1915 to
September 1916

Year

731

104

202

1,037

October 1916 to
September 1917

468

87

196

751

October 1917 to
November 1918

461

71

155

687

1,660

262

553

2,475

Total

anecdote about their indiscipline:
“They [the Van Doos] scared the pants
off the quartermaster in this Sandling
Camp, I remember they chased him.
There was some trouble over food.
We went out there and here was the
quartermaster running away and the
whole gang after him.”16 His fellow
officer F. Portwine nevertheless
added, “No, but they were good
fighters, give them credit.”17 A veteran
of the 25th Battalion remarked, “but
these Frenchmen are damn good
fighters when the 22nd was a good
unit.”18
The statistics that were gathered
from the Part II daily orders and
court-martial proceedings suggest
that the complaints and comments
of officers and soldiers alike were
well founded. The Part II daily orders

infractions also demonstrates that
the transition from life in England
to life at the front was quite difficult.
October 1915 was the unit’s most
troublesome month when members
were punished for a total of 151
minor infractions. 22 Although the
unit’s initial trench tours proved be
relatively uneventful compared to
later ones, they nonetheless made
the acquaintance of conditions that
often made life unbearable in the
frontlines such as frequent food and
water shortages and lice infestations.
The disciplinary problems continued
as the men of the unit were punished
for 122 and 117 minor infractions
in November 1915 and December
1915. 23 By January and February
1916, the behaviour of the unit began
to improve; the number of minor

5
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This series of photos, taken in July
1916, show soldiers from the 22nd
Battalion engaged in various tasks in
the trenches.

CWM 19920044-255

Top: Here, five soldiers work to repair
a muddy trench. The men are wearing
helmets and most are bent over
shovelling.
Middle: Two men are standing on the
trench floor while the third is laying down
reading in a small dugout (funkhole) in
the side of the trench. The dugout has
corrugated metal cover that is propped
up and has a helmet and mess tin sitting
on it. There is a gas alarm hanging from
the wall of the trench next to the dug
out and a number of Ross rifles with
bayonets affixed leaning beside it.

CWM 19920044-243

CWM 19920044-242

Bottom: Two men stand on the trench
floor in front of a dugout. The man on
the left side of the photo is holding a
Ross rifle. The second soldier is standing
beside him with his arms akimbo.
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infractions dropped to 86 and 35,
respectively. This change coincided
with the arrival of Tremblay who
replaced Colonel Frédéric-Mondelet
Gaudet as commander of the
battalion. During Tremblay’s first
period in command, the unit only
went through one difficult patch
in March and April 1916 when
there were respectively 95 and 124
punishments for infractions. This was
most likely the result of the battalion’s
first taste of intense combat at the St.
Éloi Craters. According to the soldiers
of the “Van Doos,” it was one of most
dangerous assignments they drew
throughout the war. Joseph Henri
Chaballe noted that “bien des soldats
d’expérience considère la ‘bataille
des craters’ comme l’épreuve la plus
terrible à laquelle les Canadiens
eurent à faire face durant la guerre,
sauf peut-être à Passchendaele.” 24
Apart from these two months, the unit
was punished for only 35 infractions
in February 1916, 74 in May, 49 in
June, 45 in July, and 36 in August.25
In September 1916, the battalion once
again went through a difficult period
as members were punished 103 times.
This may have resulted from the
unit’s participation in its first major
4
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Table 2 – Court-martial convictions of the 22nd Battalion27
Sept 1915 to
Feb 1916

Mar 1916 to
Sept 1916

Oct 1916 to
Feb 1917

Mar 1917 to
Dec 1917

Jan 1918 to
11 Nov 1918

Postwar

Total

Desertion

0

2

7

23

10

0

42

AWOL

1

5

15

25

21

9

76

Illegal absencerelated infractions

0

0

5

1

7

1

14

Infraction

Drunkenness

5

1

2

3

5

1

17

Insubordination

0

0

0

0

2

0

2

Theft/Fraud

0

3

2

4

6

7

22

Striking officer or
other rank

0

0

1

0

2

0

3

Disobeying

0

1

2

1

0

0

4

Negligence with
firearms

0

2

8

6

9

0

25

Other

0

2

3

7

7

9

28

6

16

45

70

69

27

233

Total

campaign, the Battle of the Somme.
However, unlike the period following
St. Éloi, Tremblay was not there to
restore discipline, and infractions did
not diminish. Infractions reached 103
in January 1917.26
Court-martial proceedings also
paint a negative picture of the unit’s
behaviour. (Table 2)
Like the evidence provided by the
Part II daily orders, illegal absences
(desertion and absence without
leave) were also the most frequent
infractions that were punished. 28
The “Van Doos” were charged with
118 counts of illegal absences; that is
50.6 percent of all their infractions.
These statistics also demonstrate
that the most troublesome period
for the “Van Doos” were the months
after Courcelette at the Somme
to the end of 1917; close to half
(49.4 percent) of all infractions were
committed during these months.
What is even more significant is that
just under 60 percent of all illegal
absences that were brought before
courts-martial occurred during that
time. These statistics thus confirm
Dubuc’s and Tremblay’s various
complaints, and, as courts-martial
significantly increased after March
1917, they further show that the
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009
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unit’s commanding officers sought
to correct the problem through the
use of legal procedures.
The 24th Battalion
(Victoria Rifles of Canada)

A

n examination of the other units
of the 5th Brigade is much more
complicated than that for the “Van
Doos.” Although quantitative sources
are available, qualitative ones are
much more difficult to locate. The
22nd Battalion has been commented
on and studied by various historians
and veterans alike, but the same
cannot be said about the other units
of the 5th Brigade. Although the
letters found in the courts-martial
proceedings do provide some written
statements on the overall discipline of
the units, such letters were not always

available. This analysis will therefore
focus on the statistics that were
gathered from the Part II daily orders
and court-martial proceedings.
A study of the minor infractions
reveals two contrasting stories.
Whereas members of the “Van
Doos” were punished 2,475 times,
the Victoria Rifles’ personnel were
punished only 911 times. (Table 3)
These statistics seem to indicate
that the 24th Battalion was much more
disciplined than the “Van Doos.”
The battalion’s monthly average of
infractions was much lower with
24.6 from October 1915 to September
1916, 25.3 the following year, and 23.9
during their final year at the front.
The unit’s average throughout the
war was 24.6 infractions per month.
However, like the “Van Doos,” the
Victoria Rifles also had problems

Table 3 – Minor infractions of the 24th Battalion29
Year

Absences

Drunkenness

Other Infrac.

Total

October 1915 to
September 1916

128

60

108

296

October 1916 to
September 1917

104

51

149

304

October 1917 to
November 1918

121

59

131

311

Total

353

170

388

911

7

5
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The 24th Battalion, commanded
by Lieutenant-Colonel William H.
Clark-Kennedy, VC (left), was a
well-disciplined unit. It was not
necessary to invoke the death
penalty to set an example to others
in this battalion.

CWM 19930065-766

with illegal absences. A total of
353 punishments were given for
illegal absences. They accounted
for 38.7 percent of all infractions,
compared to drunkenness (18.7
percent), which was the second
most frequent infraction.
The statistics gathered from
court-martial proceedings also
indicate a similar situation. Only
119 infractions were convicted
by courts-martial throughout the
war. (Table 4)
These statistics also seem to
indicate that the 24th Battalion
was much more disciplined than
the “Van Doos.” This is especially
true with illegal absences; men of
the Victoria Rifles were convicted
by courts-martial only 35 times
compared to 118 for the 22nd
Battalion. Not unlike the Van
Doos, however, illegal absences
were the most common breaches.
Thirty-five (29.4 percent) of the
courts-martial convictions were
for AWOL and desertion.

No member of the Victoria Rifles
was executed during the First World
War. Only three death sentences
were issued, but all were commuted.
With every death sentence passed
came several letters and appeals
from the commanding officers of
the 24th Battalion, 5th Brigade,
and 2nd Division. For example,
Sergeant F. Jennings was sentenced
to death for an absence that lasted
from 21 January 1916 until he was
apprehended on 8 January 1917.31
Appeals came from all levels of the
Canadian Corps. Lieutenant-Colonel
W.H. Clark-Kennedy, commander
of the 24th Battalion, was the first to
urge mitigation of the sentence by
arguing that the “state of discipline
of the battalion [was] good.”32 This
was followed by the appeals from
Major-General Burstall, 2nd Infantry
Division, and Brigadier-General
Ross, 5th Infantry Brigade. Burstall
argued that the death penalty be
commuted “because the discipline
in the 24th Canadian Battalion is
and has been good.”33 Ross likewise
added that “in view of the fact that the
discipline of the 24th Battalion is good
and an example is not required…I
recommend that the sentence be
commuted.”34
The fact that Clark-Kennedy’s
opinion of his battalion’s discipline

Table 4 – Court-martial convictions of the 24th Battalion30
Infraction

Sep 1915 to
Feb 1916

Mar 1916 to
Sep 1916

Oct 1916 to
Feb 1917

Mar 1917 to
Dec 1917

Jan 1918 to
11 Nov 1918

Postwar

Total

Desertion

0

2

1

2

0

0

5

AWOL

1

2

4

8

7

8

30

Illegal absence related
infractions

0

0

0

2

0

3

5

Drunkenness

2

1

5

1

1

0

10

Insubordination

0

0

0

4

2

2

8

Theft/Fraud

0

0

2

0

2

3

7

Striking officer or other rank

1

0

0

0

1

1

3

Disobeying

1

0

0

2

0

18

21

Negligence with firearms

2

0

4

4

7

1

18

Other

0

1

0

4

3

4

12

Total

7

6

16

27

23

40

119
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were shared by several officers and
outsiders render his comments
much more credible. Evidence does
not suggest that the 24th Battalion,
or any of the brigade’s battalions,
attempted to hide cases of indiscipline
on a regular basis. In fact, such a
practice would not have benefited
a commanding officer, and might
have led to significant disciplinary
problems. His men undoubtedly
would have taken advantage of such
a situation as they would have been
aware that their actions would not
result in an appearance before courtmartial. Thus, as was the case with
the “Van Doos,” an undisciplined
24th Battalion, or any other, would
likely have attracted the notice of
brigade and division commanders as
well as that of other units.
The 25th (Nova Scotia) Battalion

T

he record of minor infractions also
suggest that the 25th Battalion
was much more disciplined than the
“Van Doos.” (Table 5)
During the unit’s three years at
the front, a total of only 920 minor
infractions were punished. The
battalion’s monthly average was only
28 infractions from October 1915 to
September 1916, 21 the following

year, and 25.5 during their final
year at the front. The unit’s average
throughout the war was 24.8 per
month. However, as with the “Van
Doos,” the majority of the unit’s
infractions were illegal absences.
Throughout the war, a total of 382
punishments were given for illegal
absences, which accounted for 41.5
percent of the unit’s minor infractions.
Court-martial proceedings also
suggest the good behaviour of the
unit. A total of 109 infractions were
convicted by courts-martial. (Table 6)
The contrast with the “Van Doos”
was still more marked with illegal
absences, with only 25 convictions.
Illegal absences were nevertheless
the most frequent court-martial
conviction (22.9 percent).
Despite the battalion’s good
discipline, one of its soldiers was
executed during the war. Private
Elsworth Young suffered the death
penalty as a result of an illegal

absence during the Somme
operations. Although there is very
little evidence concerning this courtmartial, it is possible that the battalion
recommended commutation. In
his study of executions, Godefroy
noted that the commander of the
2nd Division, Major-General R.E.W.
Turner, had asked for the commutation
of the death sentence in this case.37
As was demonstrated with the 24th
Battalion, the recommendations
of the division were generally
similar to those of the brigade and
the battalion. Moreover, available
evidence concerning the 22nd and
24th Battalions, and Teresa Iacobelli’s
work have suggested that the overall
discipline of the battalion was the most
important rationale when arguing
for or against the death penalty.
Although it cannot be fully proven,
circumstantial evidence suggests that
the unit sought the commutation of
Private Young’s sentence based on

Table 5: Minor infractions of the 25th Battalion35
Year

Absences

Drunkenness

Other Infraction

Total

Oct 1915 to Sep 1916

123

60

153

336

Oct 1916 to Sep 1917

95

44

113

252

Oct 1917 to Oct 1918

164

34

134

332

Total

382

138

400

920

Table 6 – Court-martial convictions of the 25th Battalion36
Infraction

Sep 1915 to
Feb 1916

Mar 1916 to
Sep 1916

Oct 1916 to
Feb 1917

Mar 1917 to
Dec 1917

Jan 1918 to
11 Nov 1918

Postwar

Total

Desertion

0

2

1

0

0

0

3

AWOL

0

4

4

5

7

2

22

Illegal absence related
infractions

0

2

1

2

2

1

8

Drunkenness

8

6

4

4

3

0

25

Insubordination

0

0

0

1

5

0

6

Theft/Fraud

1

1

0

1

3

0

6

Striking officer or other rank

0

1

0

0

3

1

5

Disobeying

0

0

0

1

3

0

4

Negligence with firearms

0

0

3

1

3

1

8

Other

0

2

2

6

8

4

22

Total

9

18

15

21

37

9

109
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Throughout the war there was a
total of only 90 convictions. (Table 8)
There were only 28 counts of illegal
absences as compared to 118 in the
22nd Battalion. Remarkably, only
two men in the 26th Battalion were
charged with desertion. Nonetheless,
illegal absences were the most
common court-martial conviction,
28 of 90 (31.1 percent) were for AWOL
and desertion.

the good discipline of the unit. Corps
and army commands nevertheless
confirmed the death sentence. Private
Young was shot on the morning of 29
October 1916.38
The 26th (New Brunswick)
Battalion

T

he examination of the 26th (New
Brunswick) Battalion was more
problematic than the other units of
the 5th Brigade as the Part II daily
orders for the first two years of the
war are missing. (Table 7)
From January 1917 to December
1917, the 26th Battalion was punished
19.1 times per month, and 38.5 times
per month during its final year at
the front. The 22nd Battalion, on the
other hand, was punished 62.6 and
49.6 times per month during the
same time periods. However, like
the “Van Doos,” the unit also had
a problem with illegal absences as
they accounted for 53.9 percent of the
unit’s total infractions.
Court-martial proceedings also
suggest the unit’s good behaviour.

Problems of Morale in the
22nd Battalion

D

espite the fact that several
historians have commented on
the 22nd battalion’s poor discipline,
very few have attempted to explain
its cause.41 This next section argues
that poor morale, resulting from the
arrival of new recruits and a change
in leadership, played an important
role in the disciplinary problems of
the unit.42 Although military morale
is a very difficult topic to examine
as it is subjective, several historians
and specialists nonetheless agree that

Table 7 – Minor infractions of the 26th Battalion39
Year

Absences

Drunkenness

Other Infractions

Total

Jan to Dec 1917

104

26

100

230

Jan to Oct 1918

228

28

129

385

332

54

229

615

Total
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Like the 24th Battalion, the 25th
Battalion had fewer disciplinar y
problems than the 22nd Battalion. Only
one man from the unit was executed and
evidence suggests that the battalion
tried to have his sentence commuted.
Here the battalion commanding officer,
Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Blois, talks
with his soldiers, February 1918.

there is a link between poor morale
and poor discipline, and that one of
the most significant consequences of
poor morale is the aberrant behaviour
of soldiers.43
When dealing with the 22nd
Battalion, it is easy to demonstrate
that during its most troublesome
period (September 1916 to July
1917) the unit did suffer morale
problems, especially if discipline is
a good measure of a unit’s spirits.
Throughout the war, but particularly
after September 1916, members of
the unit contravened regulations
much more frequently than any
other battalion in the 5th Brigade.
More importantly, the evidence left
by Tremblay and Georges P. Vanier,
who served alongside Tremblay
in the battalion, confirms such a
breakdown of morale. In a letter
dated 12 October 1916, for example,
Vanier commented on the character of
the unit: “Le batallion a bien changé
[depuis Courcelette]; peu des anciens
restent. La gaieté d’autrefois ne règne
plus: cela n’est pas surprennant
quand on considère les amis qui ont
fait le suprême sacrifice. Ça rend
un peu triste…”44 When Tremblay
returned to the unit in February
1917, he noticed that the battalion’s
problems were much more than
disciplinary. On 2 March 1917, he
complained that “L’esprit de corps
si remarquable au 22e avant la
Somme n’existe pas, il faut tout de
suite la ressusciter.”45 Tremblay was
extremely distressed about the state
of his battalion which explains why
he resorted to harsh discipline to fix
it. His actions proved fruitful. By the
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Table 8 – Court-martial convictions of the 26th Battalion40
Infraction

Sep 1915 to
Feb 1916

Mar 1916 to
Sep 1916

Oct 1916 to
Feb 1917

Mar 1917 to
Dec 1917

Jan 1918 to
11 Nov 1918

Postwar

Total

Desertion

0

1

0

0

1

0

2

AWOL

0

2

0

9

10

5

26

Illegal absence related
infractions

0

1

0

1

0

0

2

Drunkenness

0

0

2

1

6

2

11

Insubordination

0

0

0

3

2

0

5

Theft/Fraud

0

0

0

1

7

3

11

Striking officer or other rank

0

0

1

0

1

0

2

Disobeying

0

0

0

1

1

0

2

Negligence with firearms

0

0

2

1

7

0

10

Other

1

2

3

6

7

0

19

Total

1

6

8

23

42

10

90
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summer of 1917, he commented that
the morale and the character of the
battalion was improving. On 3 July
1917, he noted that his men were
“de la plus belle humeur.”46 Even
as the unit was involved in bloody
operations at Hill 70 in mid-August
1917, Tremblay again noted that “le
moral ne pourrait être meilleur.”47
Available evidence suggests that
the arrival of reinforcements, officers
and other ranks, after the Somme
operations of 1916 significantly
affected the morale of the unit.
Reinforcements can have a
significant impact on morale as
they may alter a unit’s “esprit
de corps” as new recruits may
not share the same values and
bond as veterans. LieutenantColonel Roy R. Grinker and
Major John P. Speigel believe
that when soldiers do not share
this “esprit de corps,” poor
morale will ensue. 48 Soldiers
will perform their duties out of
fear of punishment rather than
out of a sense of pride, and will
show their resentment by an
occasional “breach of discipline
or acts of hostility.”49
As a result of the casualties
suffered in September 1916,
the unit received more than
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500 reinforcements, half of the unit’s
manpower. 50 In fact, the battalion
had lost so many men that Georges
Vanier noted that “the battalion
has changed to such an extent that
one could hardly recognize it.” 51
Tremblay complained in November
1916 that the battalion’s rookies
“n’ont pas l’esprit de corps que nous
avions développé chez nos hommes
jusqu’à Courcelette.”52 It is apparent
that these reinforcements did not

share the same commitment as the
battalion’s veterans. For example,
between October 1916 and March
1917, soldiers from the unit were
punished by courts-martial 27 times
for illegal absences.53 Out of these
27 illegal absences, 14 (51.9 percent)
were committed by soldiers who
were amongst the soldiers that joined
the unit after the Somme operations.
Moreover, seven (25.9 percent) had
joined the battalion only a few months
before Courcelette. Only six (22
percent) had been with the unit
for more than a year.
In fact, evidence suggests
that these reinforcements were
simply not up to par with the
men that gave their lives at
Courcelette; this was due to the
poor quality of the battalions
from which the reinforcements
came. In the weeks that followed
the Somme offensives, the unit
Major Georges P. Vanier, a future
governor -general of Canada,
believed that the heavy casualties
suffered by the 22nd Battalion,
and subsequent high number of
replacements which joined the unit,
adversely affected the battalion
and contributed to its disciplinary
problems.
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received a total of 600 reinforcements
from the 41st, 57th, and 69th
Battalions.54 These battalions were
based in Britain and were broken up
to feed units at the front. According
to Jean-Pierre Gagnon and Desmond
Morton, these three units suffered
from significant leadership and
disciplinary problems. The most
well-known case is described by
Desmond Morton in an article
on the 41st Battalion. As a result
of recruiting problems, the unit
depended on other units to fill the
gaps in their ranks. Morton noted
that “predictably, they handed over
their least desirable specimens.” 55
These same specimens soon joined
the ranks of the 22nd Battalion.
Morton also noted that the unit’s
officers were utterly incompetent,
12
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and provided poor training. Not
only did they suffer from drinking
problems, but according to the a
court of enquiry into the state of the
41st Battalion in March 1916, “the
officers did not seem to help and the
N.C.O.’s less. They dropped out of the
ranks themselves” during marching
orders.56 The battalion’s discipline
became such a problem that two
of its men, Lieutenant Codère and
Private Sokolovitch, were involved
in separate cases of manslaughter.
The majority of studies on
military psychology agree that one
of the most important factors in
maintaining high troop morale
is the commanding officer. 57 John
Baynes noted that “the influence of
the Commanding Officer was the
greatest overall factor in shaping

CWM 19920044-257

Soldiers of the 22nd Battalion rest in a shell hole on the way to the front, September 1917.

the battalion’s character.”58 Thomas
Tremblay embodied many qualities
of a great leader and it is easy to
understand how his leadership could
have led to such high spirits and
morale amongst the men of his unit.
Tremblay had the trust of all
who fought alongside him. In a letter
dated 5 June 1919, Georges Vanier
noted that “as long as I followed
him no harm would come to me.”
Even when they were in a difficult
situation, he never lost his confidence
in his leader and always thought
that Tremblay “would bring us
through.”59 Tremblay’s courage was
also a source of admiration. He was
an example that all respected. He was
in the front lines at Courcelette and
risked his life with his men. After the
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advance itself, one unknown soldier
noted:

directing defence…he was timeless
in his efforts; never even paused to
sleep and was the soul and spirit of

Lieutenant-Colonel Tremblay went

the defence.61

forward with the first wave and
remarking a tendency to move too
much to the right in the direction of
Martinpuch, himself ran along the
whole line, redirecting the advance…
Three times Col. Tremblay himself
was buried by the earth from shells
exploding near him.60

This same soldier explained that the
success of the battle was in large part
due to Tremblay’s work:
there is no one who is more deserving
of praise than Lieut.-Col. Tremblay
himself…He was at the forefront
of the battle, constantly exposed to
shell fire and the enemy’s snipers.
He personally placed the forward
posts and frequently visited the
whole line, encouraging his men and

Along with his tremendous
character, courage and passion,
Tremblay was a just leader and was
concerned about the safety and
the fate of his men. In his history
of the 22nd Battalion, Chaballe
noted: “Avant tout, il était juste, ce
qui est chose capitale chez un chef.
Connaissant tous ses hommes, il
s’intéressait à leurs affaires privées.
Dans la tranchée, il s’arrêtait au cours
d’une tournée pour s’entretenir avec
les soldats, demandant des nouvelles
des parents, s’informant si l’on avait
écrit, les intérrogeant au sujet de
la nourriture et des ennuis de la
guerre.”62
Tremblay was a very special
officer and his temporary loss had
a significant impact on his men. In

a letter to Henri Bourassa, editor of
Le Devoir, dated 23 January 1917,
Corneloup noted, “when the sublime
Tremblay left, these big children
looked at one another. Sadness was
written on their faces. A fear rose
up, and confidence was gone. The
second attack [at Regina Trench]
was an utter failure.” 63 Although the
loss of Tremblay played a significant
role in the battalion’s difficulties,
much of the blame must also fall
on the shoulders of Major Arthur
Dubuc, who replaced Tremblay
after the battle of Courcelette. It is no
coincidence that the unit’s problems
increased when Dubuc took over.
He was unable to restore the unit’s
morale after the Somme as Tremblay
had done after St. Éloi. A comparison
of the little evidence which survives
of his character and leadership
demonstrates that he did not share
the qualities of Tremblay and was
perhaps, a mediocre leader.64
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Two soldiers of the 22nd Battalion repair a muddy trench.
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Officers of the 22nd Battalion pose
for a group photo in June 1918. Unit
leadership played a signficant role in
determining morale.

subsequent similar ones, his men will
follow him anywhere; if he loses it,
he will never do any real good.”69
Although Dubuc might have rightly
considered the consequences of
losing both the commanding officer
and himself (the second in command),
and was justified to return, Patenaude
considered Dubuc’s caution as a sign
of weakness. The first chance Dubuc
had to prove that he was a great
leader was perhaps considered a
failure.
Dubuc was unlucky to have
replaced the almost mythical figure
of Thomas Tremblay. In contrast to
Tremblay, Dubuc appeared weak
and did not command the respect
and hearts of his men. Evidence
suggests that several individuals
believed that Dubuc was incapable of
leading the unit. As was previously
noted, the commanding officer of the
2nd Division, Major General R.E.W.
Turner, expressed his anxiousness
about the battalion’s discipline during
Dubuc’s command and wanted
Tremblay to return to the front as
soon as possible.65 Although Claudius
Corneloup believes that Dubuc
was a fine commanding officer,
he nevertheless admitted that he
had been a problem to many. He
noted, “il me semble que beaucoup
ont été injustes envers lui. Sans
avoir la témérité et l’audace du
colonel Tremblay, qui était une âme
extraordinaire, le major Dubuc était
loin d’un peureux…On a essayé
de jeter du discrédit sur cet officier
supérieur…Il n’était pas aimé parce
qu’il ne savait pas se faire aimer.”66
Moreover, it is fair to assume that
he did not display the same courage,
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and fearlessness as Tremblay. On
the night following the attack on
Courcelette, Private Leo Patenaude,
later promoted to the rank of colonel,
was ordered to make a dangerous
run from the new front back to the
original line. Despite enemy shelling
and machine gun fire, he reached his
objective. However, when Dubuc
was asked to replace Tremblay at the
front and take the same route that
he had taken, Patenaude explains: “I
don’t know if I should say that but
the second in command [Dubuc] of
the 22nd unit the same night was
ordered to report to replace Colonel
Tremblay in the church where he
was suffering from piles. The second
in command went as far as Souvre
LaFarnier and the firing was so
intense that he came back to the 5th
Brigade.”67 Gary Sheffield noted that
in order to become a true leader, a
newly appointed commander had to
gain the confidence and the hearts
of his men.68 Sheffield thus believed
that Bernard Montgomery was right
when he advised that “the first thing
a young officer must do…is go fight a
battle, and that battle is for the hearts
of his men. If he wins that battle and

Conclusion

B

y examining the discipline of
the other battalions of the 5th
Canadian Infantry Brigade and
comparing it to that of the 22nd
Battalion, this article has strengthened
the understanding of the 22nd
Battalion’s behaviour, discipline,
and ultimately, its combat record. It
first reassesses a common assumption
about the battalion’s disciplinary
problems, and reinforces it through
a comparison of the three units that
shared the wartime experiences of the
“Van Doos.” The statistics that were
gathered, along with the complaints
from battalion, brigade and divisional
officers, which were themselves
unique to the 22nd Battalion, are
convincing. This article has also
offered a new perspective on the
disciplinary problems of the unit
and has forwarded the theory that
poor morale could have been a likely
cause. Explaining why the “Van
Doos” suffered from a morale crisis is
a much more complex matter, which
needs to be further explored as new
evidence becomes available. At the
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very least, this article has provided
some plausible explanations – the
arrival of new recruits and a change in
leadership – and hopefully intriguing
leads for other historians.
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